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A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece
Cryptosystem
Nico Do¨ttling, Rafael Dowsley, Jo¨rn Mu¨ller-Quade and Anderson C. A. Nascimento
Abstract—The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has
become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on
number-theoretical problems. Differently from RSA and ElGa-
mal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum
computer. Moreover, even tough McEliece PKC has a relatively
big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather
efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding theory based
cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model – the de
facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems.
In this work, we show the first construction of a McEliece
based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext
attacks in the standard model. Our construction is inspired by
a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev.
Index Terms—Public-key encryption, CCA2 security, McEliece
assumptions, standard model
I. INTRODUCTION
Indistinguishability of messages under adaptive chosen ci-
phertext attacks is one of the strongest known notions of
security for public-key encryption schemes (PKE). Many
computational assumptions have been used in the literature
for obtaining cryptosystems meeting such a strong security
notion. Given one-way trapdoor permutations, we know how
to obtain CCA2 security from any semantically secure public-
key cryptosystem [27], [34], [23]. Efficient constructions are
also known based on number-theoretic assumptions [9] or on
identity based encryption schemes [6]. Obtaining a CCA2
secure cryptosystem (even an inefficient one) based on the
McEliece assumptions in the standard model has been an open
problem in this area for quite a while. We note, however,
that secure schemes in the random oracle model have been
proposed in [19].
Recently, Rosen and Segev proposed an elegant and simple
new computational assumption for obtaining CCA2 secure
PKEs: correlated products [33]. They provided constructions
of correlated products based on the existence of certain lossy
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trapdoor functions [29] which in turn can be based on the
decisional Diffie-Hellman problem and on Paillier’s decisional
residuosity problem [29].
In this paper, we show that ideas similar to those of Rosen
and Segev can be applied for obtaining an efficient construc-
tion of a CCA2 secure PKE built upon the McEliece assump-
tion. Inspired by the definition of correlated products [33],
we define a new kind of PKE called k-repetition CPA secure
cryptosystem and provide an adaptation of the construction
proposed in [33] to this new scenario. Such cryptosystems can
be constructed from very weak (one-way CPA secure) PKEs
and randomized encoding functions. In contrast, Rosen and
Segev give a more general, however less efficient, construction
of correlated secure trapdoor functions from lossy trapdoor
functions. We show directly that a randomized version of the
McEliece cryptosystem [28] is k-repetition CPA secure and
obtain a CCA2 secure scheme in the standard model. The
resulting cryptosystem encrypts many bits as opposed to the
single-bit PKE obtained in [33]. We expand the public and
secret-keys and the ciphertext by a factor of k when compared
to the original McEliece PKE.
In a concurrent and independent work [16], Goldwasser
and Vaikuntanathan proposed a new CCA2 secure public-key
encryption scheme based on lattices using the construction by
Rosen and Segev. Their scheme assumed that the problem of
learning with errors (LWE) is hard [32].
A direct construction of correlated products based on
McEliece and Niederreiter PKEs has been obtained by Per-
sichetti [30] in a subsequent work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length, while |S|
represents the cardinality of a set S. If n ∈ N then 1n denotes
the string of n ones. s← S denotes the operation of choosing
an element s of a set S uniformly at random. w ← A(x, y, . . .)
represents the act of running the algorithm A with inputs
x, y, . . . and producing output w. We write w ← AO(x, y, . . .)
for representing an algorithm A having access to an oracle O.
We denote by Pr[E] the probability that the event E occurs. If
a and b are two strings of bits or two matrices, we denote by
a|b their concatenation. The transpose of a matrix M is MT .
If a and b are two strings of bits, we denote by 〈a, b〉 their dot
product modulo 2 and by a ⊕ b their bitwise XOR. Un is an
oracle that returns an uniformly random element of {0, 1}n.
We use the notion of randomized encoding-function for
functions E that take an input m and random coins s and
2output a randomized representation E(m; s) from which m can
be recovered using a decoding-function D. We will use such
randomized encoding-functions to make messages entropic or
unguessable.
B. Public-Key Encryption Schemes
A Public-Key Encryption Scheme (PKE) is defined as
follows:
Definition 1: (Public-Key Encryption). A public-key en-
cryption scheme is a triplet of algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec)
such that:
• Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation
algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1n and outputs a public-key pk and a secret-key sk.
The public-key specifies the message space M and the
ciphertext space C.
• Enc is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time encryp-
tion algorithm which receives as input a public-key pk,
a message m ∈ M and random coins r, and outputs
a ciphertext c ∈ C. We write Enc(pk,m; r) to indicate
explicitly that the random coins r are used and Enc(pk,m)
if fresh random coins are used.
• Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algo-
rithm which takes as input a secret-key sk and a ciphertext
c, and outputs either a message m ∈ M or an error
symbol ⊥.
• (Completeness) For any pair of public and secret-keys
generated by Gen and any message m ∈ M it holds
that Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m; r)) = m with overwhelming
probability over the randomness used by Gen and the
random coins r used by Enc.
A basic security notion for public-key encryption schemes is
One-Wayness under chosen-plaintext attacks (OW-CPA). This
notion states that every PPT-adversary A, given a public-key
pk and a ciphertext c of a uniformly chosen message m ∈ M,
has only negligible probability of recovering the message m
(The probability runs over the random coins used to generate
the public and secret-keys, the choice of m and the coins of
A).
Below we define the standard security notions for public-
key encryption schemes, namely, indistinguishability against
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) [15] and against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [31]. Our game defini-
tion follows the approach of [17].
Definition 2: (IND-CPA security). To a two-stage adversary
A = (A1,A2) against PKE we associate the following
experiment.
Exp
cpa
PKE,A(n):
(pk, sk)← Gen(1n)
(m0,m1, state)← A1(pk) s.t. |m0| = |m1|
b← {0, 1}
c∗ ← Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← A2(c∗, state)
If b = b′ return 1, else return 0.
We define the advantage of A in the experiment as
Adv
cpa
PKE,A(n) =
∣∣∣∣Pr
[
Exp
cpa
PKE,A(n) = 1
]
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣
We say that PKE is indistinguishable against chosen-
plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) if for all probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) adversaries A = (A1,A2) the advantage of A in
the above experiment is a negligible function of n.
Definition 3: (IND-CCA2 security). To a two-stage adver-
sary A = (A1,A2) against PKE we associate the following
experiment.
Expcca2PKE,A(n):
(pk, sk)← Gen(1n)
(m0,m1, state)← A
Dec(sk,·)
1 (pk) s.t. |m
0| = |m1|
b← {0, 1}
c∗ ← Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← A
Dec(sk,·)
2 (c
∗, state)
If b = b′ return 1, else return 0.
The adversary A2 is not allowed to query Dec(sk, · ) with
c∗. We define the advantage of A in the experiment as
Advcca2PKE,A(n) =
∣∣∣∣Pr
[
Expcca2PKE,A(n) = 1
]
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣
We say that PKE is indistinguishable against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) if for all probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A = (A1,A2) that make
a polynomial number of oracle queries the advantage of A in
the experiment is a negligible function of n.
C. McEliece Cryptosystem
In this Section we define the basic McEliece cryptosys-
tem [25], following [36] and [28]. Let Fn,t be a family of
binary linear error-correcting codes given by two parameters
n and t. Each code C ∈ Fn,t has code length n and minimum
distance greater than 2t. We further assume that there exists
an efficient probabilistic algorithm Generaten,t that samples
a code C ∈ Fn,t represented by a generator-matrix GC of
dimensions l×n together with an efficient decoding procedure
DecodeC that can correct up to t errors.
The McEliece PKE consists of a triplet of probabilistic
algorithms (GenMcE, EncMcE,DecMcE) such that:
• The probabilistic polynomial-time key generation
algorithm GenMcE, computes (GC ,DecodeC) ←
Generaten,t(), sets pk = GC and sk = DecodeC and
outputs (pk, sk).
• The probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm
EncMcE, takes the public-key pk = GC and a plaintext
m ∈ Fl2 as input and outputs a ciphertext c = mGC ⊕
e, where e ∈ {0, 1}n is a random vector of Hamming-
weight t.
• The deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm
DecMcE, takes the secret-key sk = DecodeC and a
ciphertext c ∈ Fn2 , computes m = DecodeC(c) and
outputs m.
This basic variant of the McEliece cryptosystem is OW-
CPA secure (for a proof see [36] Proposition 3.1), given
that matrices GC generated by Generaten,t are pseudorandom
3(Assumption 4 below) and decoding random linear codes is
hard when the noise vector has hamming weight t.
There exist several optimization for the basic scheme,
mainly improving the size of the public-key. Biswas and
Sendrier [5] show that the public generator-matrix G can be
reduced to row echelon form, reducing the size of the public-
key from l ·n to l · (n− l) bits. However, we cannot adopt this
optimization into our scheme of section IV1, as it implies a
simple attack compromising IND-CPA security2 (whereas [5]
prove OW-CPA security).
In this work we use a slightly modified version of the
basic McEliece PKE scheme. Instead of sampling an error
vector e by choosing it randomly from the set of vectors with
Hamming-weight t, we generate e by choosing each of its
bits according to the Bernoulli distribution Bθ with parameter
θ = t
n
− ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Clearly, a simple argument based
on the Chernoff bound gives us that the resulting error vector
should be within the error capabilities of the code but for a
negligible probability in n. The reason for using this error-
distribution is that one of our proofs utilizes the fact that the
concatenation e1|e2 of two Bernoulli-distributed vectors e1 and
e2 is again Bernoulli distributed. Clearly, it is not the case that
e1|e2 is a uniformly chosen vector of Hamming-weight 2t if
each e1 and e2 are uniformly chosen with Hamming-weight t.
Using the Bernoulli error-distribution, we base the security
of our scheme on the pseudorandomness of the McEliece
matrices G and the pseudorandomness of the learning parity
with noise (LPN) problem (see below).
D. McEliece Assumptions and Attacks
In this subsection, we discuss the hardness assumptions for
the McEliece cryptosystem. Let Fn,t be a family of codes
together with a generation-algorithm Generaten,t as above and
let GC be the corresponding generator-matrices. An adversary
can attack the McEliece cryptosystem in two ways: either
he can try to discover the underlying structure which would
allow him to decode efficiently or he can try to run a generic
decoding algorithm. This high-level intuition that there are
two different ways of attacking the cryptosystem can be
formalized [36]. Accordingly, the security of the cryptosystem
is based on two security assumptions.
The first assumption states that for certain families Fn,t, the
distribution of generator-matrices GC output by Generaten,t
is pseudorandom. Let l be the dimension of the codes in Fn,t.
Assumption 4: Let GC be distributed by
(GC ,DecodeC) ← Generaten,t() and R be distributed
by R← U(Fk×n2 ). For every PPT algorithm A it holds that
|Pr[A(GC) = 1]− Pr[A(R) = 1]| < negl(n).
In the classical instantiation of the McEliece cryptosystem,
Fn,t is chosen to be the family of irreducible binary Goppa-
codes of length n = 2m and dimension l = n− tm. For this
1Neither is it possible for the scheme of [28], on which our k-repetition
McEliece scheme is based upon.
2The scheme of [28] encrypts by computing c = (m|s) · G ⊕ e). If G
is in row-echelon form, m ⊕ e′ is a prefix of c, where e′ is a prefix of e.
Thus an IND-CPA adversary can distinguish between the encryptions of two
plaintexts m0 and m1 by checking whether the prefix of c∗ is closer to m0
or m1.
instantiation, an efficient distinguisher was built for the case of
high-rate codes [12], [13] (i.e., codes where the rate are very
close to 1). But, for codes that do not have a high-rate, no
generalization of the previous distinguisher is known and the
best known attacks [8], [24] are based on the support splitting
algorithm [35] and have exponential runtime. Therefore, one
should be careful when choosing the parameters of the Goppa-
codes, but for encryption schemes it is possible to use codes
that do not have high-rate.
The second security assumption is the difficulty of the
decoding problem (a classical problem in coding theory), or
equivalently, the difficulty of the learning parity with noise
(LPN) problem (a classical problem in learning theory). The
best known algorithms for decoding a random linear code
are based on the information set decoding technique [21],
[22], [37]. Over the years, there have been improvements in
the running time [7], [3], [14], [4], [26], [1], but the best
algorithms still run in exponential time.
Below we give the definition of LPN problem following the
description of [28].
Definition 5: (LPN search problem). Let s be a random
binary string of length l. We consider the Bernoulli distribution
Bθ with parameter θ ∈ (0, 12 ). Let Qs,θ be the following
distribution:
{(a, 〈s, a〉 ⊕ e)|a← {0, 1}l, e← Bθ}
For an adversary A trying to discover the random string s,
we define its advantage as:
AdvLPNθ,A(l) = Pr[A
Qs,θ = s|s← {0, 1}l]
The LPNθ problem with parameter θ is hard if the advantage
of all PPT adversaries A that make a polynomial number of
oracle queries is negligible.
Katz and Shin [18] introduce a distinguishing variant of
the LPN-problem, which is more useful in the context of
encryption schemes.
Definition 6: (LPNDP, LPN distinguishing problem). Let
s, a be binary strings of length l. Let further Qs,θ be as in
Definition 5. Let A be a PPT-adversary. The distinguishing-
advantage of A between Qs,θ and the uniform distribution
Ul+1 is defined as
AdvLPNDPθ,A(l) =∣∣Pr [AQs,θ = 1|s← {0, 1}l]− Pr [AUl+1 = 1]∣∣
The LPNDPθ with parameter θ is hard if the advantage of all
PPT adversaries A is negligible.
Further, [18] show that the LPN-distinguishing problem is
as hard as the LPN search-problem with similar parameters.
Lemma 1: ([18]) Say there exists an algorithm A making
q oracle queries, running in time t, and such that
AdvLPNDPθ,A(l) ≥ δ
Then there exists an adversary A′ making q′ = O(qδ−2logl)
oracle queries, running in time t′ = O(tlδ−2logl), and such
that
AdvLPNθ,A′(l) ≥
δ
4
The reader should be aware that in the current state of the
art, the average-case hardness of these two assumptions, as
4(m,t) plaintext size ciphertext size security (key)
(10,50) 524 1024 491
(11,32) 1696 2048 344
(12,40) 3616 4096 471
Fig. 1. A table of McEliece key parameters and security estimates taken
from [36].
well as all other assumptions used in public-key cryptography,
cannot be reduced to the worst-case hardness of a NP-hard
problem3 (and even if that was the case, we do not even
know if P 6= NP). The confidence on the hardness of solving
all these problems on average-case (that is what cryptography
really needs) comes from the lack of efficient solutions despite
the efforts of the scientific community over the years. But
more studies are, of course, necessary in order to better assess
the difficulties of such problems. We should highlight that
when compared to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical
assumptions such as the hardness of factoring or of computing
the discrete-log, the cryptosystems based on coding and lattice
assumptions have the advantage that no efficient quantum
algorithm breaking the assumptions is known. One should also
be careful when implementing the McEliece cryptosystem as
to avoid side-channel attacks [38].
E. Signature Schemes
Now we define signature schemes (SS) and the security
notion called one-time strong unforgeability.
Definition 7: (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme is a
triplet of algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver) such that:
• Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation
algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1n
and outputs a verification key vk and a signing key dsk.
The verification key specifies the message space M and
the signature space S.
• Sign is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time signing
algorithm which receives as input a signing key dsk and
a message m ∈ M, and outputs a signature σ ∈ S.
• Ver is a deterministic polynomial-time verification al-
gorithm which takes as input a verification key vk, a
message m ∈ M and a signature σ ∈ S, and outputs
a bit indicating whether σ is a valid signature for m or
not (i.e., the algorithm outputs 1 if it is a valid signature
and outputs 0 otherwise).
• (Completeness) For any pair of signing and verification
keys generated by Gen and any message m ∈M it holds
that Ver(vk,m, Sign(dsk,m)) = 1 with overwhelming
probability over the randomness used by Gen and Sign.
Definition 8: (One-Time Strong Unforgeability). To a two-
stage adversary A = (A1,A2) against SS we associate the
following experiment.
3Quite remarkably, some lattice problems enjoy average-case to worst-case
reductions, but these are not for problems known to be NP-hard.
ExpotsuSS,A(n):
(vk, dsk)← Gen(1n)
(m, state)← A1(vk)
σ ← Sign(dsk,m)
(m∗, σ∗)← A2(m, σ, state)
If Ver(vk,m∗, σ∗) = 1 and (m∗, σ∗) 6= (m, σ) return
1, else return 0
We say that a signature scheme SS is one-time strongly
unforgeable if for all probabilist polynomial-time (PPT) ad-
versaries A = (A1,A2) the probability that ExpotsuSS,A(n)
outputs 1 is a negligible function of n. One-way functions
are sufficient to construct existentially unforgeable one-time
signature schemes [20], [27].
III. k-REPETITION PKE
A. Definitions
We now define a k-repetition Public-Key Encryption.
Definition 9: (k-repetition Public-Key Encryption). For a
PKE (Gen, Enc, Dec) and a randomized encoding-function E
with a decoding-function D, we define the k-repetition public-
key encryption scheme (PKEk) as the triplet of algorithms
(Genk, Enck, Deck) such that:
• Genk is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation
algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1n and calls PKE’s key generation algorithm k times
obtaining the public-keys (pk1, . . . , pkk) and the secret-
keys (sk1, . . . , skk). Genk sets the public-key as pk =
(pk1, . . . , pkk) and the secret-key as sk = (sk1, . . . , skk).
• Enck is a probabilistic polynomial-time encryption al-
gorithm which receives as input a public-key pk =
(pk1, . . . , pkk), a message m ∈ M and coins s and
r1, . . . , rk, and outputs a ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , ck) =
(Enc(pk1,E(m; s); r1), . . . ,Enc(pkk,E(m; s); rk)).
• Deck is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption
algorithm which takes as input a secret-
key sk = (sk1, . . . , skk) and a ciphertext
c = (c1, . . . , ck). It outputs a message m if
D(Dec(sk1, c1)), . . . ,D(Dec(skk, ck)) are all equal
to some m ∈ M. Otherwise, it outputs an error symbol
⊥.
• (Completeness) For any k pairs of public and secret-keys
generated by Genk and any message m ∈ M it holds
that Deck(sk,Enck(pk,m)) = m with overwhelming
probability over the random coins used by Genk and
Enck.
We also define security properties that the k-repetition
Public-Key Encryption scheme used in the next sections
should meet.
Definition 10: (Security under uniform k-repetition of en-
cryption schemes). We say that PKEk (built from an encryp-
tion scheme PKE) is secure under uniform k-repetition if
PKEk is IND-CPA secure.
Definition 11: (Verification under uniform k-repetition of
encryption schemes). We say that PKEk is verifiable under
uniform k-repetition if there exists an efficient deterministic
algorithm Verify such that given a ciphertext c ∈ C, the public-
key pk = (pk1, . . . , pkk) and any ski for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it
5holds that if Verify(c, pk, ski) = 1 then Deck(sk, c) = m for
some m 6=⊥ (i.e. c decrypts to a valid plaintext).
Notice that for the scheme PKEk to be verifiable, the
underlying scheme PKE cannot be IND-CPA secure, as the
verification algorithm of PKEk implies an efficient IND-CPA
adversary against PKE. Thus, we may only require that PKE
is OW-CPA secure.
B. IND-CCA2 Security from verifiable IND-CPA Secure k-
repetition PKE
In this subsection we construct the IND-CCA2 secure
public-key encryption scheme (PKEcca2) and prove its se-
curity. We assume the existence of an one-time strongly
unforgeable signature scheme SS = (Gen, Sign,Ver) and of a
PKEk that is secure and verifiable under uniform k-repetition.
We use the following notation for derived keys: For a public-
key pk = (pk01, pk
1
1, . . . , pk
0
k, pk
1
k) and a k-bit string vk we
write pkvk = (pkvk11 , . . . , pk
vkk
k ). We will use the same notation
for secret-keys sk.
• Key Generation: Gencca2 is a probabilistic
polynomial-time key generation algorithm which
takes as input a security parameter 1n. Gencca2
calls PKE’s key generation algorithm 2k times
to obtain public-keys pk01, pk
1
1, . . . , pk
0
k, pk
1
k and
secret-keys sk01, sk
1
1, . . . , sk
0
k, sk
1
k. It sets pk =
(pk01, pk
1
1, . . . , pk
0
k, pk
1
k), sk = (sk
0
1, sk
1
1, . . . , sk
0
k, sk
1
k)
and outputs pk, sk)
• Encryption: Enccca2 is a probabilistic polynomial-time
encryption algorithm which receives as input the public-
key pk = (pk01, pk
1
1, . . . , pk
0
k, pk
1
k) and a message m ∈
M and proceeds as follows:
1) Executes the key generation algorithm of the sig-
nature scheme obtaining a signing key dsk and a
verification key vk.
2) Compute c′ = Enck(pkvk,m; r) where r are random
coins.
3) Computes the signature σ = Sign(dsk, c′).
4) Outputs the ciphertext c = (c′, vk, σ).
• Decryption: Deccca2 is a deterministic polynomial-time
decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret-
key sk = (sk01, sk
1
1, . . . , sk
0
k, sk
1
k) and a ciphertext c =
(c′, vk, σ) and proceeds as follows:
1) If Ver(vk, c′, σ) = 0, it outputs ⊥ and halts.
2) It computes and outputs m = Deck(skvk, c′).
Note that if c′ is an invalid ciphertext (i.e. not all c′i decrypt
to the same plaintext), then Deccca2 outputs ⊥ as Deck outputs
⊥.
As in [33], we can apply a universal one-way hash function
to the verification keys (as in [10]) and use k = nǫ for
a constant 0 < ǫ < 1. Note that the hash function in
question need not be modeled as a random oracle. For ease
of presentation, we do not apply this method in our scheme
description.
Theorem 1: Given that SS is an one-time strongly unforge-
able signature scheme and that PKEk is IND-CPA secure and
verifiable under uniform k-repetition, the public-key encryp-
tion scheme PKEcca2 is IND-CCA2 secure.
Proof: In this proof, we closely follow [33]. Denote by
A the IND-CCA2 adversary. Consider the following sequence
of games.
• Game 1 This is the IND-CCA2 game.
• Game 2 Same as game 1, except that the signature-keys
(vk∗, dsk∗) that are used for the challenge-ciphertext c∗
are generated before the interaction with A starts. Further,
game 2 always outputs ⊥ if A sends a decryption query
c = (c′, vk, σ) with vk = vk∗.
We will now establish the remaining steps in two lemmata.
Lemma 2: It holds that viewGame1(A) ≈c viewGame2(A),
given that (Gen, Sign,Ver) is an one-time strongly unforgeable
signature scheme.
Proof: Given that A does not send a valid decryption
query c = (c′, vk, σ) with vk = vk∗ and c 6= c∗, A’s views in
game 1 and game 2 are identical. Thus, in order to distinguish
game 1 and game 2 A must send a valid decryption query
c = (c′, vk, σ) with vk = vk∗ and c 6= c∗. We will use
A to construct an adversary B against the one-time strong
unforgeability of the signature scheme (Gen, Sign,Ver). B
basically simulates the interaction of game 2 with A, however,
instead of generating vk∗ itself, it uses the vk∗ obtained from
the one-time strong unforgeability experiment. Furthermore,
B generates the signature σ for the challenge-ciphertext c∗
by using its signing oracle provided by the one-time strong
unforgeability game. Whenever A sends a valid decryption
query c = (c′, vk, σ) with vk = vk∗ and c 6= c∗, B termi-
nates and outputs (c′, σ). Obviously, A’s output is identically
distributed in Game 2 and B’s simulation. Therefore, if A
distinguishes between game 1 and game 2 with non-negligible
advantage ǫ, then B’s probability of forging a signature is
also ǫ, thus breaking the one-time strong unforgeability of
(Gen, Sign,Ver).
Lemma 3: It holds that AdvGame2(A) is negligible in the
security parameter, given that PKEk is verifiable and IND-
CPA secure under uniform k-repetition.
Proof: Assume that AdvGame2(A) ≥ ǫ for some non-
negligible ǫ. We will now construct an IND-CPA adver-
sary B against PKEk that breaks the IND-CPA security of
PKEk with advantage ǫ. Instead of generating pk like game
2, B proceeds as follows. Let pk∗ = (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗k) be
the public-key provided by the IND-CPA experiment to B.
B first generates a pair of keys for the signature scheme
(vk∗, dsk∗) ← Gen(1n). Then, the public-key pk is formed
by setting pkvk
∗
= pk∗. All remaining components pkji of
pk are generated by (pkji , sk
j
i ) ← Gen(1
n), for which B
stores the corresponding skji . Clearly, the pk generated by B
is identically distributed to the pk generated by game 2, as
the Gen-algorithm of PKEk generates the components of pk
independently. Now, whenever A sends a decryption query
c = (c′, vk, σ), where vk 6= vk∗ (decryption queries with
vk = vk∗ are not answered by game 2), B picks an index
i with vki 6= vk∗i and checks if Verify(c′, pk, skvkii ) = 1, if
not it outputs ⊥. Otherwise it computes m = D(Dec(ski, c′i)).
Verifiability guarantees that it holds that Deck(skvk, c′) = m,
i.e. the output m is identically distributed as in game 2.
When A sends the challenge-messages m0,m1, B forwards
6m0,m1 to the IND-CPA experiments and receives a challenge-
ciphertext c∗′. B then computes σ = Sign(dsk∗, c∗′) and sends
c∗ = (c∗′, vk∗, σ) to A. This c∗ is identically distributed
as in game 2. Once A produces output, B outputs whatever
A outputs. Putting it all together, A’s views are identically
distributed in game 2 and in the simulation of B. Therefore
it holds that AdvIND−CPA(B) = AdvGame2(A) ≥ ǫ. Thus B
breaks the IND-CPA security of PKEk with non-negligible
advantage ǫ, contradicting the assumption.
Plugging Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together immediately
establishes that any PPT IND-CCA2 adversary A has at most
negligible advantage in winning the IND-CCA2 experiment
for the scheme PKEcca2.
IV. A VERIFIABLE k-REPETITION MCELIECE SCHEME
In this section, we will instantiate a verifiable
k-repetition encryption scheme PKEMcE,k =
(GenMcE,k,EncMcE,k,DecMcE,k) based on the McEliece
cryptosystem.
In [28] it was proved that the cryptosystem obtained by
changing the encryption algorithm of the McEliece cryptosys-
tem to encrypt s|m (where s is random padding) instead of
just encrypting the message m (the so called Randomized
McEliece cryptosystem) is IND-CPA secure, if |s| is chosen
sufficiently large for the LPNDP to be hard (e.g. linear in the
security-parameter n). We will therefore use the randomized
encoding-function E(m; s) = s|m (with |s| ∈ Ω(n)) in our
verifiable k-repetition McEliece scheme. As basis scheme
PKE for our verifiable k-repetition McEliece scheme we use
the OW-CPA secure textbook McEliece with a Bernoulli error-
distribution.
The verification algorithm VerifiyMcE(c, pk, ski) works as
follows. Given a secret-key ski from the secret-key vector sk, it
first decrypts the i-th component of c by x = DecMcE(ski, ci).
Then, for all j = 1, . . . , k, it checks whether the vectors
cj ⊕ xGj have a Hamming-weight smaller than t, where
Gj is the generator-matrix given in pkj . If so, VerifyMcE
outputs 1, otherwise 0. Clearly, if VerifyMcE accepts, then all
ciphertexts cj are close enough to the respective codewords
xGj , i.e. invoking DecMcE(skj , cj) would also output x. There-
fore, we have that VerifiyMcE(c, pk, ski) = 1, if and only if
DecMcE,k(sk, c) = m for some m ∈M.
A. Security of the k-repetition Randomized McEliece
We now prove that the modified Randomized McEliece is
IND-CPA secure under k-repetition.
By the completeness of each instance, the probability that
in one instance i ∈ {1, . . . , k} a correctly generated ciphertext
is incorrectly decoded is negligible. Since k is polynomial, it
follows by the union bound that the probability that a correctly
generated ciphertext of PKEk,McE is incorrectly decoded
is also negligible. So PKEk,McE meets the completeness
requirement.
Denote by R1, . . . ,Rk random matrices of size l × n, by
G1, . . . ,Gk the public-key matrices of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem and by e1, . . . , ek the error vectors. Define l1 = |s|
and l2 = |m|. Let Ri,1 and Ri,2 be the l1 × n and l2 × n
sub-matrices of Ri such that RTi = RTi,1|RTi,2. Define Gi,1
and Gi,2 similarly.
Lemma 4: The scheme PKEMcE,k is IND-CPA secure,
given that both the McEliece assumption and the LPNDP
assumption hold.
Proof: Let A be an IND-CPA adversary against
PKEMcE,k. Consider the following three games.
• Game 1 This is the IND-CPA game.
• Game 2 Same as game 1, except that the components
pki of the public-key pk are computed by pki =
(Ri, t,M, C) instead of pki = (Gi, t,M, C), where Ri
is a randomly chosen matrix of the same size as Gi
• Game 3 Same as game 2, except that the components
ci of the challenge-ciphertext c∗ are not computed by
ci = (s|m)Ri⊕ei but rather chosen uniformly at random.
Indistinguishability of game 1 and game 2 follows by a
simple hybrid-argument using the McEliece assumption, we
omit this for the sake of brevity. The indistinguishability of
game 2 and game 3 can be established as follows. First
observe that it holds that ci = (s|m)Ri ⊕ ei = (sRi,1 ⊕
ei) ⊕mRi,2 for i = 1, . . . , k. Setting R1 = R1,1| . . . , |Rk,1,
R2 = R1,2| . . . , |Rk,2 and e = e1| . . . |ek, we can write
c∗ = (sR1 ⊕ e) ⊕ mR2. Now, the LPNDP assumption
allows us to substitute sR1 ⊕ e with a uniformly random
distributed vector u, as s and R1 are uniformly distributed
and e is Bernoulli distributed. Therefore c∗ = u ⊕ mR2 is
also uniformly distributed. Thus we have reached game 3.
A’s advantage in game 3 is obviously 0, as the challenge-
ciphertext c∗ is statistically independent of the challenge bit
b. This concludes the proof.
V. GENERALIZED SCHEME
As in [33], it is possible to generalize the scheme to encrypt
correlated messages instead of encrypting k times the same
message m. In this Section, we show that a similar approach
is possible for our scheme, yielding an IND-CCA2 secure
McEliece variant that has asymptotically the same ciphertext
expansion as the efficient IND-CPA scheme of [19]. We now
present a generalized version of our encryption scheme using
a correlated plaintext space.
A. Definitions
Definition 12: (τ -Correlated Messages) We call a tuple of
messages (m1, . . . ,mk) τ -correlated for some constant 0 <
γ < 1 and τ = (1 − γ)k, if given any τ messages of tuple it
is possible to efficiently recover all the messages. We denote
the space of such messages tuples by MCor.
Basically, τ -correlated messages can be erasure-corrected.
Now we define a correlated public-key encryption scheme.
Definition 13: (Correlated Public-Key Encryption). For a
PKE (Gen, Enc, Dec) and a randomized encoding-function
E that maps from the plaintext-space M to the correlated
plaintext-space MCor (with corresponding decoding-function
D), we define the correlated public-key encryption scheme
(PKECor) as the triplet of algorithms (GenCor, EncCor, DecCor)
such that:
7• GenCor is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation
algorithm which takes as input a security parameter
1n and calls PKE’s key generation algorithm k times
obtaining the public-keys (pk1, . . . , pkk) and the secret-
keys (sk1, . . . , skk). GenCor sets the public-key as pk =
(pk1, . . . , pkk) and the secret-key as sk = (sk1, . . . , skk).
• EncCor is a probabilistic polynomial-time encryption al-
gorithm which receives as input a public-key pk =
(pk1, . . . , pkk) and a message m ∈ M. The algo-
rithm computes m˜ = (m˜1, . . . , m˜k) = E(m; s) (with
fresh random coins s) and outputs the ciphertext c =
(c1, . . . , ck) = (Enc(pk1, m˜1), . . . ,Enc(pkk, m˜k)).
• DecCor is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption
algorithm which takes as input a secret-key sk =
(sk1, . . . , skk) and a ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , ck). It first
computes a tuple m˜ = (m˜1, . . . , m˜k) ∈ MCor, outputs
m = D(m˜) if m˜ ∈MCor, if not it outputs an error symbol
⊥.
• (Completeness) For any k pairs of public and
secret-keys generated by GenCor and any message
m = (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ MCor it holds that
DecCor(sk,EncCor(pk,m)) = m with overwhelming prob-
ability over the randomness used by GenCor and EncCor.
We also define security properties that the Correlated Public-
Key Encryption scheme used in the next sections should meet.
Definition 14: (Security of Correlated Public-Key Encryp-
tion). We say that PKECor (built from an encryption scheme
PKE) is secure if PKECor is IND-CPA secure.
Definition 15: (τ -Verification). We say that PKECor is τ -
verifiable if the exists a efficient deterministic algorithm
Verify, such that given a ciphertext c ∈ C, the public-
key pk = (pk1, . . . , pkk) and any τ distinct secret-keys
skT = (skt1 , . . . , sktτ ) (with T = {t1, . . . , tτ}), it holds that
if Verify(c, pk, T, skT ) = 1 then DecCor(sk, c) = m for some
m 6=⊥ (i.e. c decrypts to a valid plaintext).
B. IND-CCA2 Security from IND-CPA Secure Correlated PKE
We now describe the IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryp-
tion scheme (PKE′cca2) built using the correlated PKE and
prove its security. We assume the existence of a correlated
PKE, PKECor, that is secure and τ -verifiable. We also use
an error correcting code ECC : Σl → Σk with minimum
distance τ and polynomial-time encoding. Finally, we assume
the existence of an one-time strongly unforgeable signature
scheme SS = (Gen, Sign,Ver) in which the verification keys
are elements of Σl (we assumed that the verification keys
are elements of Σl only for simplicity, we can use any
signature scheme if there is a injective mapping from the set
of verification keys to Σl).
We will use the following notation: For a codeword d =
(d1, . . . , dk) ∈ ECC, set pk
d = (pkd11 , . . . , pk
dk
k ). Analogously
for sk.
• Key Generation: Gen′cca2 is a probabilistic polynomial-
time key generation algorithm which takes as input a
security parameter 1n. Gen′cca2 proceeds as follows. It
calls PKE’s key generation algorithm |Σ|k times obtain-
ing the public-keys (pk11, . . . , pk
|Σ|
1 , . . . , pk
1
k, . . . , pk
|Σ|
k )
and the secret-keys (sk11, . . . , sk
|Σ|
1 , . . . , sk
1
k, . . . , sk
|Σ|
k ).
Outputs pk = (pk11, . . . , pk
|Σ|
1 , . . . , pk
1
k, . . . , pk
|Σ|
k ) and
sk = (sk11, . . . , sk
|Σ|
1 , . . . , sk
1
k, . . . , sk
|Σ|
k ).
• Encryption: Enc′cca2 is a probabilistic polynomial-time
encryption algorithm which receives as input the public-
key pk = (pk11, . . . , pk
|Σ|
1 , . . . , pk
1
k, . . . , pk
|Σ|
k ) and a
message m = (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈ M and proceeds as
follows:
1) Executes the key generation algorithm of the signa-
ture scheme SS obtaining a signing key dsk and a
verification key vk. Computes d = ECC(vk). Let di
denote the i-element of d.
2) Computes c′ = EncCor(pkd,m).
3) Computes the signature σ = Sign(dsk, c′).
4) Outputs the ciphertext c = (c′, vk, σ).
• Decryption: Dec′cca2 is a deterministic polynomial-time
decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret-key
sk = (sk11, . . . , sk
|Σ|
1 , . . . , sk
1
k, . . . , sk
|Σ|
k ) and a ciphertext
c = (c′, vk, σ) and proceeds as follows:
1) If Ver(vk, c′, σ) = 0, it outputs ⊥ and halts. Other-
wise, it performs the following steps.
2) Compute d = ECC(vk).
3) Compute m = DecCor(skd, c) and output m.
Theorem 2: Given that SS is an one-time strongly unforge-
able signature scheme and that PKECor is secure and τ -
verifiable, the public-key encryption scheme PKE′cca2 is IND-
CCA2 secure.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to the proof of
theorem 1. Denote by A the IND-CCA2 adversary. Consider
the following two of games.
• Game 1 This is the IND-CCA2 game.
• Game 2 Same as game 1, except that the signature-keys
(vk∗, dsk∗) that are used for the challenge-ciphertext c∗
are generated before the interaction with A starts. Further,
game 2 terminates and outputs ⊥ if A sends a decryption
query with c = (c′, vk, σ) with vk = vk∗.
Again, we will split the proof of Theorem 2 in two lemmata.
Lemma 5: From A’s view, game 1 and game 2 are com-
putationally indistinguishable, given that SS is an existentially
unforgeable one-time signature-scheme.
We omit the proof, since it is identical to the proof of lemma
2.
Lemma 6: It holds that AdvGame2(A) is negligible in the
security parameter, given that PKECor is verifiable IND-CPA
secure correlated public-key encryption scheme.
Proof: We proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3. Assume
that AdvGame2(A) ≥ ǫ for some non-negligible ǫ. We will now
construct an IND-CPA adversary B against PKECor that breaks
the IND-CPA security of PKECor with advantage ǫ. Again,
instead of generating pk like game 2, B will construct pk using
the public-key pk′ provided by the IND-CPA experiment. Let
d = ECC(vk∗). B sets pkd = pk∗. All remaining components
pk
j
i of pk are generated by (pk
j
i , sk
j
i ) ← Gen(1
n), for which
B stores the corresponding skji . Obviously, the pk generated
by B is identically distributed to the pk generated by game
2, as in both cases all components are pkji are generated
independently by the key-generation algorithm Gen of PKE.
8Whenever A sends a decryption query with vk 6= vk∗, B
does the following. Let d = ECC(vk) and d∗ = ECC(vk∗).
Since the two codewords d and d∗ are distinct and the code
ECC has minimum-distance τ , there exist a τ -set of indices
T ⊆ {1, . . . , k} such that it holds for all t ∈ T that dt 6= d∗t .
Thus, the public-keys pkdtt , for t ∈ T were generated by
B and it thus knows the corresponding secret-keys skdtt . B
checks if Verify(c′, pkd, T, skdT ) = 1 holds, i.e. if c′ is a
valid ciphertext for PKECor under the public-key pkd. If so, B
decrypts m˜T = (m˜t|t ∈ T ) = (Dec(skdtt , c′t)|t ∈ T ). Since the
plaintext-space MCor is τ -correlated, B can efficiently recover
the whole message m˜ from the τ -submessage m˜T . Finally, B
decodes m = D(m˜) to recover the message m and outputs m
to A. Observe that the verifiability-property of PKECor holds
regardless of the subset T used to verify. Thus, from A’s view
the decryption-oracle behaves identically in game 2 and in B’s
simulation.
Finally, when A sends its challenge messages m0 and
m1, B forwards m0 and m1 to the IND-CPA experiment
for PKECor and receives a challenge-ciphertext c∗′. B then
computes σ = Sign(sk∗, c∗′) and outputs the challenge-
ciphertext c′ = (c∗′, vk∗, σ) to A. When A generates an
output, B outputs whatever A outputs.
Putting it all together, A’S views are identically distributed
in game 2 and B’s simulation. Therefore, it holds that
AdvIND−CPA(B) = Advgame2(A) ≥ ǫ. Thus, B breaks the
IND-CPA security of PKECor with non-negligible advantage
ǫ, contradicting the assumption.
Plugging Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 establish that any PPT
IND-CCA2 adversary A has at most negligible advantage in
winning the IND-CCA2 experiment for the scheme PKE′cca2.
C. Verifiable Correlated PKE based on the McEliece Scheme
We can use a modified version of the scheme presented
in Section IV to instantiate a τ -correlated verifiable IND-
CPA secure McEliece scheme PKEMcE,Cor. A corresponding
IND-CCA2 secure scheme is immediately implied by the
construction in Section V-B. As plaintext-space MCor for
PKEMcE,Cor, we choose the set of all tuples (s|y1, . . . , s|yk),
where s is a n-bit string and (y1, . . . , yk) is a codeword
from code C that can efficiently correct k − τ erasures.
Clearly,MCor is τ -correlated. Let EC be the encoding-function
of C and DC the decoding-function of C. The randomized
encoding-function EMcE,Cor used by PKEMcE,Cor proceeds as
follows. Given a message m and random coins s, it first
computes (y1, . . . , yk) = EC(m) and outputs (s|y1, . . . , s|yk).
The decoding-function DMcE,Cor takes a tuple (s|y1, . . . , s|yk)
and outputs DC(y1, . . . , yk). Like in the scheme of Section IV,
the underlying OW-CPA secure encryption-scheme PKE is
textbook-McEliece.
The τ -correlatedness of PKEMcE,Cor follows directly by
the construction of MCor, EMce,Cor and DMce,Cor. It remains
to show verifiability and IND-CPA security of the scheme.
The VerifyMcE-algorithm takes a ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , ck),
a public-key pk, an a partial secret-key skT (for a τ -sized
index-set T ) and proceeds as follows. First, it decrypts the
components of c at the indices of T , i.e. it computes xt =
DecMcE(skt, ct) for t ∈ T . Then, it checks whether all xt
are of the form xt = s|yt for the same string s. If not, it
stops and outputs 0. Next, it constructs a vector y˜ ∈ Σk
with y˜i = yi for i ∈ T and y˜i =⊥ (erasure) for i /∈ T .
Verify then runs the erasure-correction algorithm of C on y˜. If
the erasure-correction fails, it stops and outputs 0. Otherwise
let y = (y1, . . . , yk) be the corrected vector returned by the
erasure-correction. Then, Verify sets x = (s|y1, . . . , s|yk). Let
G1, . . . ,Gk be the generator-matrices given in pk1, . . . , pkk.
Finally, Verify checks whether all the vectors cj ⊕ xGj , for
j = 1, . . . , k, have Hamming-weight smaller than t. If so, it
outputs 1, otherwise 0. Clearly, if VerifyMcE outputs 1, then the
ciphertext-components cj of c are valid McEliece encryptions.
The IND-CPA-security is proven analogously to Lemma
4. First, the McEliece generator-matrices Gi are replaced
by random matrices Ri, then, using the LPNDP-assumption,
vectors of the form sRi⊕ei are replaced by uniformly random
vectors ui. Likewise, after this transformation the adversarial
advantage is 0.
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